This article presents a strategic model of liability and litigation under court errors. Our framework allows for endogenous choice of level of care and endogenous likelihood of filing and disputes. We derive sufficient conditions for a unique universally divine mixed-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium under low court errors. In this equilibrium, some defendants choose to be grossly negligent; some cases are filed; and some lawsuits are dropped, some are resolved out of court, and some go to trial. We find that court errors in the size of the award, as well as damage caps and split awards, reduce the likelihood of trial but increase filing and reduce the deterrence effect of punitive damages. We derive conditions under which the adoption of the English rule for allocating legal costs reduces filing.
Introduction
Punitive damage awards have been widely criticized as capricious and ''unpredictable.'' It is hard to predict which actions the jury will find sufficient to justify a punitive award, whether the legal standard is framed in terms of gross negligence, wanton or reckless misconduct, or flagrant indifference to the safety of others. 1 Firms are then unable to take specific measures to avoid liability, and therefore, the deterrence effect of punitive damages 2 cannot be realized (Economic Report of the President 2004).
3 There is also a common perception that excessive punitive damage awards 4 generate a plaintiff's windfall (i.e., an amount in excess of the costs of pursuing the punitive claim), which promotes unnecessary litigation (Dodson 2000) and the escalation of liability insurance premiums. 5 In an attempt to overcome some of these negative effects, several U.S. states have implemented different kinds of tort reform (Sloane 1993) . Some reforms take the form of caps or limits on punitive damage awards, 6 whereas others, called ''split awards,'' have mandated that a share of the award be allocated to the plaintiff with the remainder going to the state. 7 In addition, the adoption of the English rule for allocating legal costs (fee shifting) 8 has been proposed. 9 Proponents of split awards state that,
1. The exact words used to describe the standard for punitive damages vary by jurisdiction. In this article, we use ''gross negligence'' to represent the punitive damage standard.
2. Punitive damages are primarily intended to punish defendants for their egregious conduct against society and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct in the future (Sloane 1993) .
3. Besides undermining deterrence, unpredictability of punitive damages may also affect the incentives to file a lawsuit and to litigate.
4. In Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) , Justice O'Connor reported that punitive damage awards had ''skyrocketed,'' increasing more than 30 times in the previous 10 years, with an increase in the highest award from $250,000 to $10,000,000.
5. Note that liability coverage is widely spread in the United States. In 1990, the total tort liability payments were approximately $65 billion (more than 1% of the U.S. gross domestic product), of which 93.5% were made by liability insurers (O'Connell 1994) .
6. Damage caps have been widely implemented in the United States. Approximately 30 states currently employ some form of liability limits (Babcock and Pogarsky 1999) .
There exist as many different cap schemes as states that employ them, ranging from Georgia's straightforward cap, which limits punitive damages to $250,000, to elaborate attempts to tailor punitive damages to the assets of the defendant and the degree that the defendant benefited from his/her tortuous conduct. Some states employ a flat dollar cap, a multiplier of compensatory damages, or some combination of both. Some caps pertain to all civil cases, whereas others apply to certain classes of actions, such as medical malpractice or product liability. ''½The variety of statutory damage limitations share a common feature-they circumscribe a previously unbounded array of potential trial outcomes'' (Babcock and Pogarsky 1999, 345) . In this article, we employ a straightforward cap, one that limits plaintiff's recovery to a specific dollar amount, that is, reduces the maximum plaintiff's recovery.
7. Split awards have been implemented in Alaska, California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, and Utah. New Jersey and Texas have contemplated, but not yet adopted, splitaward statutes (White 2002) .
Statutes vary with the state: the base for computation of the state's share can be the gross punitive award or the award net of attorney's fees; the state's share can be 50%, 60%, or 75%; the destination of the state's funds can be the Treasury, the Department of Human Services, or indigent victims funds. For details, see Sloane (1993) , Epstein (1994) , Stevens (1994) , and Dodson (2000) .
8. Under the American rule each party pays his/her own litigation costs at trial. In contrast, under the English rule the loser at trial pays the litigation costs of the winner.
9. Florida temporarily adopted (for the period 1980-1985) a mandatory fee-shifting rule in medical malpractice cases (see Snyder and Hughes 1990; Hughes and Snyder 1995). contrary to damage caps that reduce both the incentives to file a lawsuit and deterrence, split awards reduce the incentives to file a lawsuit but maintain adequate levels of deterrence and punishment (Sloane 1993) .
This study attempts to capture the main effects of tort reform of ''unpredictable'' punitive damages and to assess the effects of ''unpredictability'' of punitive awards on deterrence and litigation. We present an original gametheoretic framework, which allows for endogenous decision on care, filing, and disputes under asymmetric information, heterogeneous types of plaintiffs, and unpredictable punitive damages. Unpredictable punitive damages are modeled by assuming that ambiguously defined guidelines or jury instructions generate random mistakes from the court in the size of the award. 10 As a result, unpredictable punitive damages are observed. 11 We then apply this framework to study the effects of court errors, damage caps, and split awards. Finally, we extend our benchmark model to study the effects of fee shifting.
Our model consists of three stages. In the first stage, the potential injurer decides whether to be grossly negligent. This decision depends on the cost of preventing accidents and on the expected litigation loss in case of an accident. The level of care determines the probability that an accident occurs. If an accident occurs, the second stage, called the filing stage, starts. Nature decides the opportunity cost of time for the potential plaintiff from a continuum of types. 12 The potential plaintiff then decides whether to file a lawsuit. If a lawsuit is filed, the third stage, called the pretrial bargaining stage, starts. It consists of a signaling-ultimatum game, where two Bayesian risk-neutral parties, an uninformed plaintiff, and an informed defendant 13 negotiate prior to a costly trial. We derive sufficient conditions for a unique universally divine (Banks and Sobel 1987) mixed-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) 10. Alternatively, court errors can be interpreted as errors in the assessment of liability (Polinsky 1997 ). Our framework is suitable for both interpretations.
11. ''In most states, there is an statute describing the conditions under which punitive damages may be awarded . . . These statutes merely provide guidelines for awarding punitive damages. Because the guidelines have not been formulated into exact rules, there is much uncertainty about when punitive damages can be awarded'' (Cooter and Ulen 2004, 372) . In addition, empirical studies show that cognitive limitations preclude juries to correctly mapping their judgments onto dollar values (Sunstein et al. 1998) .
12. This cost, independent of the defendant's level of care, captures the effect of personal characteristics of plaintiffs that influence the decision to file a lawsuit. Empirical research on filing has found that besides the severity and financial losses caused by the injury, demographic and economic characteristics of injured people (age, sex, education, and income), which are exogenous to the damage level (and, therefore, to the level of care that defendants exert), influence the decision of injured people to file a lawsuit. Sabry and Dunbar (2004) find, for instance, that potential plaintiff's income and probability of filing are negatively related.
Attorney search costs provide another reason why the cost of filing suit might differ across plaintiffs. Some tort victims know attorneys; others do not. If a victim knows an attorney, he/ she might feel more comfortable pursuing a cause of action with that attorney or asking to be referred to another attorney. Like other plaintiff-specific characteristics, these search costs are independent of the merits of the case.
13. The defendant possesses information about his/her level of care and the decision of the court should the case go to trial. under low court errors. In this equilibrium, some defendants choose to be grossly negligent; some cases are filed. Of the cases filed, some lawsuits are dropped, some are resolved out of court, and some go to trial. We find that court errors in assessing the size of the award, as well as damage caps and split awards, reduce the likelihood of trial but increase filing and reduce the deterrence effect of punitive damages. Finally, we derive conditions under which the adoption of the English rule for allocating legal costs reduces filing.
Several policy implications follow from the analysis. First, the model points to the significance of the strategic behavior of plaintiff and defendant for the analysis of the effects of tort reform on deterrence. In particular, the analysis indicates that damage caps and split awards may reduce the expected loss for a grossly negligent defendant. Therefore, both polices can reduce deterrence. Second, the analysis underlines the importance of the defendant's care decision for the study of the effects of tort reform on filing. The analysis indicates, somewhat counterintuitively, that damage caps and split awards may increase the number of lawsuits. The reason is this: the reform measures limit the plaintiff's recovery in each individual case but also reduce overall deterrence (i.e., a higher fraction of defendants choose to be grossly negligent). As such, the filing plaintiff has a greater chance of confronting a grossly negligent defendant. This ''pool'' effect outweighs the plaintiff's lower expected recovery from suit. And, as a result, the tort reform measures generate more lawsuits.
14 To the best of our knowledge, Hylton (1993 Hylton ( , 2002 are the only two papers that analyze liability and litigation using game-theoretic models, which allow for endogenous decision on care, filing, and disputes under asymmetric information and court errors. Hylton (1993) studies the effects of the English rule under certain model parameterization and finds that the likelihood of trials and deterrence (when legal costs are high) are higher under the English rule. Hylton (2002) examines settlement rates, plaintiff win rates, and compliance with the due-care standard. He also assesses the effects of the English rule under certain model parameterization and finds that this rule is superior to the American rule in terms of social welfare. The effects of court errors on 14. Indeed, this result may reflect ''fishing'' expeditions by plaintiffs, which are sometimes observed in practice. Given that there are more grossly negligent defendants under damage caps and split awards, more plaintiffs might file lawsuits just to see what happens (i.e., whether the defendant caves and makes a positive settlement offer). This result may suggest that states adopting these reforms should, simultaneously, consider strengthening the sanctions for frivolous lawsuits. In addition, this result suggests that plaintiffs' attorneys in states with lower overall deterrence need not do as much investigation of the plaintiff's claim before filing suit. Note also that the same general insight follows in differing regulatory environments. Jurisdictions with looser regulation and, hence, less deterrence of business misconduct should actually see more lawsuits. This result holds because plaintiffs in these jurisdictions have an incentive to file a lawsuit because they have an increased chance of confronting grossly negligent defendants. Finally, it bears significant mention that this result is similar in spirit to the one derived in Bernardo et al. (2000) . They show that prodefendant rules, specifically legal presumptions, can in equilibrium lead to more lawsuits. However, their model does not include settlement at the litigation stage. Our framework includes settlement and, as such, can be seen as an extension of their work. settlement are ambiguous. The effects of court errors on deterrence and filing and the effects of damage caps and split awards are not analyzed. Png (1987) and Landeo and Nikitin (forthcoming) study tort reform by constructing game-theoretic models, which allow for endogenous decision on care and disputes under asymmetric information. Filing and court errors are not studied. Png (1987) analyzes the effects of damage caps and the adoption of the English rule and finds that damage caps reduce the expenditures on safety and fee shifting lowers the level of care for careful defendants, increases the level of care for negligent defendants, and increases the frequency of trial. The effect of damage caps on disputes is ambiguous, and the effect of damage caps on filing is not studied. Landeo and Nikitin (forthcoming) extend previous work on split awards (Kahan and Tuckman 1995; Daughety and Reinganum 2003) 15 by including the analysis of deterrence. Their model predicts, under certain conditions that, holding filing constant, a decrease in the plaintiff's share of the award decreases the conditional probability of trial. In addition, they find that split awards reduce the expenditures on safety. Snyder and Hughes (1990) and Hughes and Snyder (1995) empirically study the effects of the adoption of the English rule in Florida and find that the English rule increases plaintiff success rates at trial and the average jury awards. These findings suggest that the English rule lowers the filing of low-merit cases. Babcock and Pogarsky (1999) analyze the effect on settlement rates of a damage cap set lower than the value of the underlying claim, using a bargaining experiment. They find that damage caps constrain the parties' judgments and produce more settlement. Landeo et al. (forthcoming) experimentally study split awards and find that this reform reduces the likelihood of trial.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the benchmark model and describes the equilibrium solution. Section 3 analyzes the effects of court errors, split awards, and damage caps under this benchmark model. Section 4 describes the effects of fee shifting. Section 5 contains concluding remarks and outlines possible directions for further research.
The Benchmark Model
We model the interaction between a potential injurer 16 and a potential plaintiff as a sequential game of asymmetric information under court errors. In this benchmark model, we assume that the allocation of the legal costs follows the American rule, that is, each party pays its own legal costs.
15. Kahan and Tuckman (1995) construct a simultaneous-move game between a plaintiff and a defendant and find, in the absence of agency problems, that split awards reduce the plaintiff's litigation expenses and, consequently, reduce the expected amount paid by the defendant. Daughety and Reinganum (2003) incorporate asymmetry of information and strategic behavior to the study of split awards by modeling the pretrial bargaining as a game of incomplete information. They find that holding filing constant, split awards simultaneously lower settlement amounts and the likelihood of trial.
16. We will use the terms injurer and defendant interchangeably.
We focus our analysis on a equilibrium in which some defendants choose to be grossly negligent; some weak cases are filed; and some lawsuits are dropped, some are resolved out of court, and some go to trial. This equilibrium resembles the actual state of affairs of lawsuit termination.
17

Model Setup
The potential injurer first decides his/her optimal level of care e, that is, the one that minimizes his/her total expected loss L, where e 2 fe 0 , e 1 g. The injurer is grossly negligent if the level of care chosen is e 0 ; otherwise, the injurer is simply negligent and therefore not liable for punitive damages. High level of care e 1 costs the injurer c, whereas low level of care e 0 costs nothing. The probability of accidents is k(e), where
where l is the expected loss from legal action. We take this loss as parametric in order to describe L, but ultimately, l will be derived as the continuation value of the litigation stage, and hence, it will differ for grossly negligent and not liable defendants. The endogenous probability that a defendant is negligent is represented by p. The choice of level of care is privately known by the defendant. The potential plaintiff knows that the defendant can choose between these two possible levels and that only the low level of care implies gross negligence.
If an accident occurs, the filing stage starts. Nature first decides the opportunity cost of time for the potential plaintiff, K F . This cost is exogenous and randomly selected from a continuum of types and distributed on ½0; K F :
18 We define /ðÁÞ and FðÁÞ as the probability density and cumulative density functions of the distribution of plaintiffs by opportunity cost of time, respectively. /ðÁÞ and FðÁÞ; as well as the realization of K F , are common knowledge. Then, the potential plaintiff decides whether to file a lawsuit. The filing decision is based on the potential plaintiff's costs K F and his/her beliefs about the level of negligence of the defendant, conditional on the occurrence of an accident. With probability q he/she believes that the defendant is grossly negligent, and with probability (1 ÿ q) he/she believes that the defendant is negligent. 17. Data from the U.S. Department of Justice indicate, for a sample of the largest 75 counties (1-year period ending in 1992), that 76.5% of product liability cases were disposed through agreed settlement and voluntary dismissal and 3.3% were disposed by trial verdict. The other 20.2% were disposed as follows: 4.5% by summary judgment, 0.5% by default judgment, 6% were dismissed, 2.7% by arbitration award, 6.1% by transfer, and 0.3% by other dispositions (Smith et al. 1995) .
18. K F is independent of the defendant's level of care. It captures the effect of personal characteristics of potential plaintiffs that influence the decision to file a lawsuit. Empirical research on filing has found, that besides the severity and financial losses caused by the injury, demographic and economic characteristics of injured people (age, sex, education, and income), which are exogenous to the damage level (and therefore to the level of care that defendants exert), influence the decision of injured people to file a lawsuit. Sabry and Dunbar (2004) find, for instance, that potential plaintiff's income and probability of filing are negatively related.
19. The values for q and (1 ÿ q) are taken as parametric during the pretrial bargaining subgame, but they ultimately depend on the optimal decision of filing by the plaintiff and on the optimal levels of care chosen by the injurer in the first stage of the game, according to the cost of care and his/her expected litigation costs (that correspond to the equilibrium in the pretrial litigation stage).
A potential plaintiff will file a lawsuit if its expected payoff from suing (i.e., expected litigation payoff minus K F ) is positive. The endogenous probability that a lawsuit is filed is represented by m.
If a lawsuit is filed, a pretrial bargaining negotiation starts. It is modeled as a signaling-ultimatum game between two Bayesian risk-neutral players, a potential injurer and a potential plaintiff. 20 The defendant has the first move and makes a settlement proposal. After observing the proposal, the plaintiff, who knows only the two possible choices of care that the defendant can choose, decides whether to drop the case, to accept the defendant's proposal (outof-court settlement), or to reject the proposal (bring the case to the trial stage). The plaintiff's decision is based on his/her updated beliefs about the type of defendant he/she is confronting after observing the defendant's proposal. If the plaintiff drops the case, both players incur no legal costs. If the plaintiff accepts the defendant's proposal, the game ends and the defendant pays the amount proposed to the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff rejects the proposal, plaintiff and defendant incur exogenous legal costs (K P and K D , respectively), and the court decides whether to award punitive damages A to the plaintiff. Unpredictable punitive damages are modeled by assuming that ambiguously defined guidelines for determining the size of punitive damage awards generate random mistakes from the court in the size of the award. We assume that the distribution of the potential awards is binomial with two possible values, 0 and A, and that the court awards A with probability 1 ÿ s 1 and 0 with probability s 1 if the defendant is grossly negligent. If the defendant is simply negligent, the court then mistakenly awards A with probability s 2 and awards 0 with probability 1 ÿ s 2 . We also assume that s 1 þ s 2 < 1. This implies that (1 ÿ s 1 )A > s 2 A, that is, the mean award is higher for the grossly negligent defendant. Therefore, the expected award depends on the defendant's conduct. Under the split-award regime, and in the event that punitive damages A are awarded, the plaintiff receives only a fraction f of the award A and the state gets a share (1 ÿ f ) of the award. We employ here a straightforward definition of cap, one that limits the plaintiff's recovery to a specific dollar amount and, therefore, reduces the maximum plaintiff's recovery A.
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The sequence of events in the game is shown in Figure 1 . Note that, A is determined by the jury and the information about the splitaward statute is supposed to be kept from the jury, and A does not depend on f. Then, we will treat A and f as exogenous parameters of the model. Note also that, without loss of generality, for the sake of mathematical tractability and given that our primary goal is to explore the effect of tort reform on punitive damages (i.e., damage caps and split-award statutes), we abstract from 20. We model the pretrial bargaining stage by following Png (1987) and Landeo and Nikitin (forthcoming) .
21. Given that we consider only one positive award A, we are implicitly assuming that all plaintiffs have the same damage type. However, court's errors in assessing the size of the award, generates different expected awards for plaintiffs with the same level of damage. compensatory damages. 22 In addition, given that punitive damages are awarded only in cases where the defendant is found grossly negligent (i.e., 22. We recognize that the claims for punitive damages must piggyback on a tort claim with compensatory damages. Our model can be modified to incorporate compensatory damages, without altering the qualitative predictions presented here. Consider a simplified product liability case. Once an accident occurs, assume the manufacturer stipulates to liability. This is not an unreasonable assumption, given that, in many cases where punitive damages are at issue, the defendant does not contest liability. Under this assumption, the court awards compensatory damages CDA (which are common knowledge) whenever the accident happens, but it awards punitive damages, A, only if the firm is grossly negligent. Assume also bifurcation of trial, that is, two separate trials decide on compensatory and punitive damage awards; that the compensatory damages game has the same structure as the punitive damages game presented here; and that legal costs, K PCDA and K DCDA , are paid by the plaintiff and defendant, respectively, only in case of trial.
Then, in case of an accident, the plaintiff and the defendant do not have asymmetric information with regard to prospective compensatory damage awards, and therefore, they settle out of court. Thus, every defendant will offer CDA ÿ K PCDA , and every plaintiff will accept.
Thus, the total loss function is given by L ¼ c(e) þ k(e)(CDA ÿ K PCDA þ l), where l is the expected loss from legal action related to punitive damages. It is easy to show that all qualitative results presented in Sections 4 and 5 will hold.
where the defendant's actions were malicious, oppressive, gross, or willful and wanton), we consider only two choices of care: exert a level of care e ¼ 1, that is, meet the standard for gross negligence and exert a level of care e ¼ 0, that is, not to meet the standard and, therefore, be liable for punitive damages. 
Equilibrium Under Low Court Errors
We focus our analysis on the equilibrium under low court errors, that is, s 1 and s 2 are below some threshold, and s 1 þ s 2 < 1. This characteristic of court errors conforms to the empirical findings. 24 In this equilibrium, some defendants will choose to be grossly negligent, whereas others will choose to be negligent, and only some cases are filed. In addition, some negligent defendants reveal their gross negligence through offers to settle, which are accepted by plaintiffs. Other gross negligent defendants try to hide their type by mimicking the behavior of negligent defendants and make no offer. There are a sufficient number of those grossly negligent and ''dishonest'' defendants for the information provided to the plaintiff by the action chosen by the defendant (refusal to settle) to be not transparent. Therefore, some plaintiffs respond to a refusal to settle by bringing their case to trial, whereas others drop their action.
This equilibrium constitutes the unique PBE of the game that survives the universal divinity refinement 25 of Banks and Sobel (1987) under the following conditions: 23. Note that our qualitative results hold in a framework that allows for three choices of care: careful, negligent, and grossly negligent. Assume that the costs of care are strictly increasing in the amount of care and that punitive damages are awarded only in case of gross negligence. Then, if the cost of being careful is sufficiently high, the strategy ''careful'' is strictly dominated by the strategy ''negligent.'' So, the rational defendant will randomize only between negligence and gross negligence. The influence of the choice of care on the litigation stage will be then throughq and ð1 ÿqÞ; whereq represents the probability that an accident is caused by a grossly negligent defendant. Hence, all our qualitative results will hold.
24. Tullock (1980) estimates the probability of legal error generally to be about 0.13. 25. See Reinganum and Wilde (1986) , Schweizer (1989) , and Landeo and Nikitin (forthcoming) for previous applications of the universal divinity refinement to litigation games.
26. The formal proofs of all the propositions are lengthy and contained in an appendix. It can also be retrieved online from the authors at http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/;econweb/landeo/.
Condition (1) rules out the pooling PBE where negligent defendants behave as grossly negligent defendants in the pretrial bargaining stage. It also guarantees that at least some potential plaintiffs file a lawsuit (i.e., it ensures m > 0).
27 Conditions (2) and (3) guarantee that some but not all defendants choose to be grossly negligent (i.e., they ensure q < 1 and q > 0, respectively). Additionally, conditions (2) and (3) ensure that not all potential plaintiffs file a lawsuit (i.e., they ensure m < 1). Finally, conditions (2) and (3) rule out the pooling PBE where the deterrence effect of punitive awards totally vanishes. In this pooling equilibrium, all defendants choose to be grossly negligent, all injured plaintiffs file a lawsuit, and all cases are settled out of court.
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Under conditions (1)- (3), however, the pretrial bargaining subgame has other partially separating equilibria 29 and other pooling equilibria, but they do not survive the universal divinity refinement (see Appendix for details).
Proposition 1 characterizes the unique universally divine equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 1. Assume that conditions (1)- (3) hold. Then, the following strategy profile, together with the players' beliefs, represents the equilibrium path of the unique universally divine PBE of the game.
Strategy Profile.
1. The plaintiff files a lawsuit with probability
In response to an offer S 1 ¼ 0, the plaintiff rejects the offer (goes to trial) with probability a ¼ ð1ÿs 1 ÞfAÿK P ð1ÿs 1 ÞAþK D and accepts the offer (drops the action) with probability (1 ÿ a); the plaintiff always accepts the offer S 2 ¼ ð1 ÿ s 1 ÞfA ÿ K P (settles out of court). 2. The defendant chooses to be negligent with probability p ¼
The grossly negligent defendant makes no offer (offers S 1 ¼ 0) with probability b ¼ ðK P ÿs 2 fAÞð1ÿqÞ q½ð1ÿs 1 ÞfAÿK P and offers S 2 ¼ (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P with probability (1 ÿ b). The negligent defendant always makes no offer (offers S 1 ¼ 0).
27. In addition, it ensures that s 1 þ s 2 < 1. 28. Intuitively, at high levels of court error (i.e., when s 1 ! s 1 or s 2 ! s 2 ), the incentives for filing are maximized and the highest level of filing is achieved, that is, m ¼ 1. At those levels of error, filing is insensitive to the liability of defendants, and therefore, there are no incentives to invest in care.
29. These other partially separating equilibria do not allow for cases to be dropped, and therefore, they do not conform to the empirical regularities on termination of lawsuits.
2.2.2 Plaintiff's Beliefs. The equilibrium beliefs are as follows. If an accident occurs, the plaintiff believes with probability (1 ÿ q) that he/she is confronting a negligent defendant, and with probability q that he/she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant. When the plaintiff receives an offer, he/she updates his/her beliefs using the Bayes' rule: when he/she receives an offer S 1 ¼ 0, he/she believes with probability ð1ÿqÞ qbþð1ÿqÞ that he/she is confronting a negligent defendant and with probability qb qbþð1ÿqÞ that he/she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant; when the plaintiff receives an offer S 2 ¼ fA ÿ K P , he/she believes with certainty that he/she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant. The off-equilibrium beliefs are as follows. When the plaintiff receives an offer S# such that 0 < S# < (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P or when he/she receives an offer S# > (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P , he/she believes that this offer was made by a grossly negligent defendant.
Proof. See Appendix.
Although the model is solved formally in the appendix, here we outline the main steps of the solution. The model is solved backward. We start by finding the solution of the pretrial bargaining subgame. 30 Then, we evaluate the plaintiff's filing decision and assess the defendant's choice of care.
Consider the expected payoffs for the plaintiff, negligent defendant, and grossly negligent defendant, in terms of a and b. The expected payoff for the plaintiff is
ÿ aÞð0Þ; and the expected payoff for the grossly negligent defendant is
The values of a and b are calculated from the condition that both parties (the plaintiff and the grossly negligent defendant) have to be indifferent between their strategies to mix them. So,
Equation (4) says that a grossly negligent defendant is indifferent between admitting his/her gross negligence (i.e., offering S 2 ¼ (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P ) and stating that he/she is negligent (i.e., offering S 1 ¼ 0). The grossly negligent defendant risks losing (1 ÿ s 1 )A þ K D if the case goes to court. Equation (5) 30. The values for q and (1 ÿ q) are taken as parametric during the pretrial bargaining subgame, but they ultimately depend on the optimal filing decision by the plaintiff and on optimal levels of care chosen by the injurer in the first stage of the game, according to the cost of care and his/her expected litigation costs (that correspond to the equilibrium in the pretrial litigation stage).
says that a plaintiff is indifferent between dropping the case and getting a payoff of S 1 ¼ 0 and going to court. Solving equation (4) for a and equation (5) for b, we get
and
The expected litigation payoffs for the plaintiff, negligent, and grossly negligent defendant are
respectively. The conditional probability of trial is
The conditional probability of out-of-court settlement is
And, the conditional probability of dropping a case is
Using the previous results on plaintiff's expected payoff from litigation, we analyze now the plaintiff's decision about filing. A plaintiff will file a lawsuit if his/her expected payoff from suing (i.e., expected litigation payoff net of K F ) is positive, 31 that is, if
Then, the probability of filing is
Now, we will proceed to analyze the defendant's choice of care. The defendant decides the level of care y taking into account
, where l i is the expected loss from legal action. This loss differs for negligent and grossly negligent defendants.
where c is the cost of care (i.e., cost of choosing to be negligent), m is the probability that a lawsuit is filed, k i is the probability of an accident, l 0 ¼ ½(1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P is the expected litigation loss for a grossly negligent defendant, and l 1 ¼
We construct an equilibrium in which some defendants choose to be negligent and others choose to be grossly negligent. This is the equilibrium behavior that conforms to the asymmetry of the pretrial bargaining subgame and to the real-world behavior of potential injurers.
The defendant will randomize only if he/she is indifferent between the expected payoffs from both strategies.
This condition can be rewritten as
where the left-hand side of equation (15) represents the defendant's cost of accident prevention and the right-hand side represents the defendant's benefit from accident prevention, that is, the difference in the unconditional expected litigation costs for grossly negligent and negligent defendants. From equation (14), the indifference condition for randomization between e 1 and e 0 , we find m, the probability of filing that supports the randomization of choice of care.
It is important to note, that m > 0 because k 0 > k 1 (by assumption) and because condition (2) ensures that
In addition, conditions (3) and (4) guarantee that m < 1 (see Proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix). Now we can obtain q, the probability that an accident is caused by a grossly negligent defendant. From equation (12),
Then,
The expression for q is always positive because K P > s 2 fA by condition (3). In addition, condition (2) implies that q < 1 (see Proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix). Finally, we get the expression for p, the probability that a defendant chooses to be negligent. By Bayes' rule, q ¼
Using equation (18),
Given the previous results, the probability of accident is
, where p is given by equation (20). Now, we can derive the unconditional probability trial. The probability of trial conditional on occurrence of the accident and filing is ; then the unconditional probability of trial is
is the probability that a defendant has been negligent conditional on the occurrence of an accident, then, the unconditional probability of trial is equal to
where m is given by equation (16) and p is given by equation (20) . Similarly, given that the probability of out-of-court settlement conditional on occurrence of the accident and filing is equal to q 1 ÿ ðK P ÿs 2 fAÞð1ÿqÞ q½ð1ÿs 1 ÞfAÿK P h i ; then the unconditional probability of out-of-court settlement is equal to l ÿ k 1 p½fAð1ÿs 1 Þÿs 2 ð1ÿs 1 ÞfAÿK P m: Finally, given that the probability of dropping a case conditional on the occurrence of an accident and filing is 1 ÿ
then the unconditional probability of dropping a case is equal to
32 32. Note that the signaling framework adopted here involves no trial for grossly negligent types, who reveal, and positive probability for grossly negligent types, who pool with negligent types. On the other hand, a separating equilibrium in a screening framework (with the same information structure) would involve a plaintiff's demand, which is accepted by grossly negligent defendants and rejected by negligent defendants. Hence, there are some qualitative differences in the equilibria of the signaling and screening models. However, the comparative statics results are qualitatively similar across models, with the exception that, given that m does not depend on f in the screening model, there is no impact of split awards on the probability of filing under that framework. Hence, the effects of split awards on filing can be analyzed only under a signaling framework. This is the reason for which we decided to adopt this framework.
Comparative Statics Under the Benchmark Model
This section analyzes the effects of court errors, damage caps, and split awards on the likelihood of trials (conditional probability of trial) and filing (m), on the deterrence effect of punitive awards (p), and on the probability of an accident (l). We assume that the changes in s 1 , s 2 , A, or f are small enough to preserve conditions (1)-(3).
Effects of Court Errors
Punitive awards have been widely criticized for their unpredictability. It has been argued that this unpredictability lowers the deterrence effect of punitive damages (see, e.g., Polinsky and Shavell 1989) . We show here that randomness in the size of the award, that is, court errors, indeed lower deterrence. In addition, court errors increase case filings but reduce the likelihood of trials.
Proposition 2. A reduction in the size of the expected award for a plaintiff confronting a grossly negligent defendant (i.e., an increase in the probability that a grossly negligent defendant will not be asked to pay any award, s 1 ) decreases the probability of trial, increases the probability of filing, decreases the deterrence effect of punitive awards, and, therefore, increases the probability of an accident.
Proof. See Appendix. An increase in s 1 reduces the plaintiff's expected payoff from suing (expected litigation payoff net of filing cost) by lowering the expected recovery at trial. But, an increase in s 1 also increases the plaintiff's expected payoff from suing by reducing deterrence and, therefore, increasing the probability that an accident is caused by a grossly negligent defendant, q. This effect operates as follows. An increase in s 1 reduces the expected litigation losses for a grossly negligent defendant and, therefore, reduces the difference in expected litigation losses for negligent and grossly negligent defendants. Stated differently, an increase in s 1 reduces the potential defendant's benefit from taking care. This reduction in deterrence increases the probability of accidents. Since more defendants are taking less care, the probability that an accident is caused by a grossly negligent defendant, q, increases. We show that the increase in the plaintiff-expected payoff from suing (due to an increase in q) offsets the reduction due to a lower expected recovery at trial. Hence, the probability of filing increases.
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In addition, given that an increase in s 1 reduces the likelihood that a grossly negligent defendant will pay A, plaintiffs are less willing to go to court, and 33. Note that the increase in filing increases the incentives to take care. However, the effect of s 1 on the difference in expected litigation losses for negligent and grossly negligent defendants offsets this second effect. As a consequence, an increase in s 1 reduces deterrence. therefore, plaintiffs accept more frequently out-of-court offers, that is, the probability of rejection of a zero offer by the plaintiff a goes down.
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Proposition 3. An increase in the size of the expected award for a plaintiff confronting a negligent defendant (i.e., an increase in the probability that a negligent defendant will be asked to pay A, s 2 ) increases the probability of filing.
Proof. See Appendix. An increase in s 2 , that is, an increase in the likelihood that a negligent defendant will be asked to pay A, increases the plaintiff's expected payoff from suing. Thus, the incentives to file a lawsuit are higher and the probability of filing increases. 
Effects of Damage Caps and Split Awards
We assess the effects of the adoption of damage caps and split awards. Given that damage caps reduce the maximum plaintiff's recovery at trial A, the adoption of damage caps is represented by a reduction in A. The introduction of split awards is represented by a reduction in f, the plaintiff's share of the punitive award.
Proponents of split awards argue that, in contrast to caps that reduce both the plaintiff's windfall and the deterrence effect of the punitive awards, the splitaward statute constitutes a ''move toward effectuating the true purpose of punitive damages'' (Sloane 1993, 473) . 36 They claim that split awards reduce the plaintiff's windfall but maintain adequate levels of deterrence and punishment. 37 These claims are based on the observation that both split awards and damage caps reduce the plaintiff's recovery at trial, but contrary to damage caps, split awards do not reduce the loss for the grossly negligent defendant at trial. We show here, that the decision on care depends not only on the loss for the defendant at trial but also on the out-of-court settlement outcomes (which 34. Note also that an increase in s 1 reduces the expected loss at trial for a grossly negligent defendant (1 ÿ s 1 )A þ K D and, therefore, reduces the willingness of grossly negligent defendants to make positive out-of-court offers (i.e., increases the likelihood that a zero offer comes from a grossly negligent defendant). This will decrease the plaintiff's willingness to accept zero offers (i.e., increases a). However, we show that this latter effect is offset by the first effect of s 1 (reduction in a). Hence, the probability of trial decreases.
35. The effects of s 2 on the deterrence effect of punitive awards and on the probabilities of an accident and disputes are ambiguous.
36. The main purposes behind the award of punitive damages are to punish defendants for their egregious conduct against society and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. In addition, punitive damages serve to encourage plaintiffs to bring forth minor criminal offenses that are not likely to be prosecuted yet nonetheless are offensive to society and compensate plaintiffs for their attorneys' fees (Sloane 1993) .
37. In addition, split awards allow the plaintiffs to receive a share of the awards for payment of attorney fees and rewards for their civil duty as ''private attorney generals '' (Case Note 1993; Sloane 1993; Epstein 1994; Stevens 1994; Evans 1998; Dodson 2000) .
are affected by both reforms). Given that the incentives to take care are lower under both reforms, both split awards and damage caps reduce the deterrence effect of punitive damages. We also show that, if we consider the impact of these reforms not only on the plaintiff's recovery at trial but also on deterrence, then we can conclude that both split awards and caps increase the likelihood of filing.
In addition, we find that the adoption of split awards and damage caps reduces the likelihood of trials. Experimental studies conducted by Babcock and Pogarsky (1999) and Landeo et al. (forthcoming) on damage caps and split awards, respectively, support our theoretical results.
Proposition 4. The introduction of damage caps or split awards decreases the probability of trial, increases the probability of filing, decreases the deterrence effect of punitive awards, and, therefore, increases the probability of an accident.
A decrease in A or f reduces the plaintiff's expected payoff from suing (i.e., reduces the incentives to file a lawsuit) by lowering the expected recovery at trial. But a reduction in A or f also increases the plaintiff's expected payoff from suing by lowering deterrence and, therefore, increasing the likelihood of confronting a grossly negligent defendant, q. This effect operates in the following way. A decrease in A or f reduces the defendant's benefit from accident prevention (i.e., the difference in the expected litigation costs for grossly negligent and negligent defendants) and, therefore, reduces the incentives to take care. 38 As a consequence, the deterrence effect of punitive damages is reduced (and the probability of accidents increases). Then, it will be more likely that grossly negligent defendants cause accidents, that is, q will be higher. Hence, the plaintiff's expected payoff from suing will increase. We show that the increase in the plaintiff's expected payoff from suing (due to an increase in q) offsets the reduction due to a lower expected recovery at trial. As a result, the probability of filing increases. 39 38. Specifically, a decrease in A or f reduces the defendant's benefit from accident prevention through its effect on the probability that a plaintiff rejects a zero offer: a reduction in f or A lowers the plaintiff's expected recovery at trial and, therefore, reduces the probability that a plaintiff rejects a zero offer. As a consequence, the expected loss for a grossly negligent defendant is reduced, the incentives to take care are also reduced, and q increases.
In case of damage caps, however, there is an additional effect to consider. A reduction in A also decreases the difference in the expected losses at trial for grossly negligent and negligent defendants and, therefore, reduces the incentives to take care and increases q even more. Hence, damage caps and split awards increase the probability that a grossly negligent defendant is involved in an accident, q, but there are some quantitative differences in the effects of both reforms.
39. Note that the increase in filing increases the incentives to take care. However, the effect of A or f on the difference in expected litigation losses for grossly negligent and negligent defendants offsets this second effect. As a consequence, a decrease in A or f reduces deterrence.
In addition, given that a decrease in A or f reduces the expected recovery at trial, plaintiffs are more willing to accept a zero offer. Then, the probability that the plaintiff rejects a zero offer, a, goes down. As a consequence, the probability of trial decreases. 
Effects of Fee Shifting
We now proceed to analyze the effects of adopting the English rule for allocating legal costs by comparing the results from the benchmark model with the results from a modified version of this model under the English rule.
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Empirical studies of the effects of the adoption of the English rule in Florida during the period 1980 -1985 (Snyder and Hughes 1990 Hughes and Snyder 1995) indicate that fee shifting results in higher compensations and higher frequency of cases where plaintiffs win. These findings suggest a reduction of filing of less meritorious cases. Our model indeed captures this effect. Proposition 5 summarizes this result.
Proposition 5. The adoption of the English rule as a method for allocating legal costs decreases filing if s 1 <
The condition s 1 <
implies that s 1 should be relatively small. This condition conforms to empirical findings (Tullock 1980) . Note also that this is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition.
Intuitively, given that under the English rule the plaintiff should pay the legal costs of both parties in case of losing at trial, the plaintiff's expected payoff from suing is lower under the English rule. Then, the incentives to file a lawsuit are reduced, and hence, the likelihood of filing is lower under the English rule.
If, in addition, s 2 is sufficiently big, the English rule not only raises the likelihood of trials but also increases the deterrence effect of punitive damages 40. Note, with a damage cap, there is an additional effect on the probability of trial that parallels an increase in s 1 . A reduction in A also decreases the expected loss at trial for a grossly negligent defendant and, therefore, reduces the willingness of grossly negligent defendants to make positive out-of-court offers (i.e., increases the likelihood that a zero offer comes from a grossly negligent defendant). This will decrease the plaintiff's willingness to accept zero offers (i.e., increases a). We show that this latter effect is offset by the first effect of A (reduction in a). In the end, both damage caps and split awards reduce the probability of trial. Note, however, that, as with the probability that a grossly negligent defendant is involved in an accident, there are some quantitative differences in the effects of both reforms.
41. The setup of this modified model is similar to the one presented in Section 2. The only difference is the rule for allocating legal costs in case of trial: under the English rule, the losing party at trial pays the legal costs of both parties. The structure of the equilibrium is also similar to the one adopted for the benchmark model. Details about the equilibrium strategy profile and beliefs of the model under the English rule are available in the Appendix.
We assume that conditions stated in Proposition 1 and Proposition A1 (equilibrium under the English rule model, in the Appendix) hold. and, therefore, lowers the probability of an accident. Proposition 6 summarizes this result.
Proposition 6. The adoption of the English rule as a method for allocating legal costs increases the probability of trial, increases the deterrence effect of punitive awards, and, therefore, decreases the probability of an accident if
Note that the conditions s 1 <
The difference in expected litigation losses for grossly negligent and negligent defendants is higher under the English rule. Then, the incentives to take care may be greater and the deterrence effect may be higher under the English rule, even though the likelihood of filing is lower. This higher deterrence under the English rule reduces the likelihood of confronting negligent defendants at trial and, therefore, decreases the willingness of plaintiffs to go to trial (i.e., the probability of rejecting zero offers goes down). This effect decreases the likelihood of trials. However, the higher deterrence also increases the willingness of defendants to make no offers (i.e., the probability of making zero offers goes up). This effect increases the likelihood of trials. We show that, if s 2 is big enough and s 1 is small enough, the second effect offsets the first one, and therefore, the likelihood of trials is higher under the English rule. 
Conclusions
This article presents a strategic model of liability and litigation under court errors. The framework allows for endogenous decision about investment in accident prevention and endogenous likelihood of filing and disputes. This article is not the first to consider liability and litigation in the same framework but is the first to apply a framework with endogenous decisions on care, filing, and dispute, under court errors, to the analysis of damage caps and split awards. We construct an equilibrium under low court errors, where some (but not all) defendants choose to be grossly negligent; some (but not all) cases are filed; and some lawsuits are dropped, some are resolved out of court, and some go to trial. We then use this benchmark model to analyze the effects of court errors, damage caps, split awards, and fee shifting. We find that court errors in assessing liability of negligent defendants, as well as damage caps and split awards, reduce the likelihood of trial but increase filing and reduce the deterrence effect of punitive damages. We find conditions under which the adoption of the 42. From the empirical findings (Tullock 1980) , we should infer that court errors are in general low. Then, even though s 2 does not meet the sufficient condition on Proposition 6, we should expect that the results stated in that proposition be more likely as s 2 increases.
English rule for allocating legal costs reduces filing. Our model proves to be complete, that is, it captures the main effects of tort reform of punitive damages but tractable enough to be used as a tool for the analytical study of tort reform and court errors.
Our analysis has several policy implications. First, it points to the significance of the strategic behavior of plaintiff and defendant for the analysis of the effects of tort reform on deterrence. In particular, the analysis indicates that both damage caps and split awards may reduce the expected loss for a grossly negligent defendant, and therefore, they may reduce deterrence. Second, the analysis underlines the importance of the defendant's care decision for the analysis of the effects of tort reform on filing and indicates that damage caps and split awards may increase the plaintiff's expected payoff from suing by increasing the likelihood of confronting grossly negligent defendants. Therefore, caps and split awards may increase filing of lawsuits.
Avenues for further research may involve an extension of this benchmark model by allowing the awards to depend also on the lawyer's effort. This model can be then used to evaluate the new method of lawyer's payment proposed by Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2003) . Using an asymmetric information model of litigation, Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2003) show that this payment method aligns the interests of lawyers and clients, by providing the incentives to the lawyers to do exactly what a knowledgeable client would want him/her to do with respect to accepting the case, spending time on the case, and settling the case. However, their model does not allow for endogenous choice of level of care or court errors in assessing the liability of the defendant.
Appendix
Proofs of Propositions 1-4, solution of the model of liability and litigation under the English rule, and proofs of Propositions 5 and 6 follow.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof has three main parts. In the first part, we prove the existence of the partially separating equilibria of the pretrial bargaining subgame, under conditions (1)-(3). In the second part, we show that the partially separating equilibrium of the pretrial bargaining subgame, proposed in Proposition 1, is the only partially separating equilibrium of the pretrial bargaining stage that survives the universal divinity refinement and, therefore, is the unique universal divine PBE of the pretrial bargaining stage. In the third part, we complete the proof of the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the whole game, proposed in Proposition 1. First, we prove that some but not all potential plaintiffs file a lawsuit; second, we show that some but not all potential injurers are grossly negligent; and, third, we prove that the described mixed-strategy equilibrium is the only equilibrium of the game.
Part 1: Existence of PBE of the litigation game. Part 1.1: We eliminate the dominated and iteratively dominated strategies for each player.
Rationality suggests that since the plaintiff can get at most (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P at trial, the plaintiff should accept any pretrial offer over (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P . That is, any strategy that calls for the plaintiff to reject an offer greater than (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P is weakly dominated by a strategy in which he/she accepts the offer. 43 Rationality also suggests, given that the plaintiff can drop the case and lose nothing, the plaintiff should reject any pretrial offer S < 0. That is, any strategy that calls for the plaintiff to accept an offer lower than zero is dominated by a strategy in which he/she rejects the offer.
Because the plaintiff accepts all offers over (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P (maximum payoff at trial), any strategy in which the defendant offers more than (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P when he/she is grossly negligent is iteratively dominated by a strategy in which he/she offers exactly (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P . Rationality also tells us that the defendant will offer no more than K D (loss for a no-grossly-negligent defendant at trial) if he/she is no-grossly-negligent. Finally, because the plaintiff rejects all offers below zero, any strategy in which the defendant offers less than zero is iteratively dominated by a strategy in which he/she offers exactly zero. Then, the minimum possible offer is S ¼ 0 and represents the defendant's refusal to settle.
Hence, after eliminating the dominated strategies and a first round of elimination of the iteratively dominated strategies for each player, we can restrict our attention to the offer space ½0, (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P for the grossly negligent defendant (i.e., a proposal cannot be negative or greater than the maximum payoff the plaintiff can get in court) and to the offer space ½0, s 2 A þ K D for the no-grossly-negligent defendant (i.e., a proposal cannot be negative or greater than the maximum loss the no-grossly-negligent defendant can get in court).
Let us apply iterative elimination of dominated strategies again. Because the no-grossly-negligent defendant never offers more than s 2 A þ K D and since the plaintiff can get (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P at trial, rationality suggests that the plaintiff should reject any pretrial offer over s 2 A þ K D and lower than (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P . That is, any strategy that calls for the plaintiff to accept such an offer is iteratively dominated by a strategy in which he/she rejects the offer. Rationality also tells us that the grossly negligent defendant will not make any offer greater than s 2 A þ K D and lower than (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P . Then, the offer space for a grossly negligent defendant gets reduced to ½0;
Part 1.2: We prove that in equilibrium the grossly negligent defendant randomizes at most between two possible strategies. In Part 1.1 we show that the offer space for the grossly negligent defendant is given by 43 . It is only weakly dominated because the second strategy does not result in a strictly higher payoff against every one of the defendant's strategies. In particular, it does not result in a strictly higher payoff if the defendant's strategy is to refuse to offer a settlement (i.e., offer S ¼ 0) whether grossly negligent or no-grossly-negligent. ½0, s 2 A þ K D g f(1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P g, then it suffices to show that there is no more than one equilibrium offer S 1 2 ½0, s 2 A þ K D .
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We consider three steps. First, we show that there is no equilibrium offer in this interval, which is proposed by the grossly negligent defendant only. Second, we show that there is no equilibrium offer in the interval proposed by the no-grossly-negligent defendant only. Finally, we show that there are no two distinct equilibrium proposals proposed by both types of defendants. Part 1.2.1: If such an equilibrium offerS existed, the plaintiff would reject it with probability 1. Hence, the case would be resolved at trial, and the grossly negligent defendant would lose A þ K D . He/she is better off offering (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P , which is accepted with certainty. Part 1.2.2: If such an equilibrium offerS existed, then the plaintiff would accept it with probability 1. Hence, the grossly negligent defendant would be better off, switching to this offer. Part 1.2.3: We prove it by contradiction. Assume that there exist two such offers, S 1 and S 2 , such that 0
Denote by p 1 and p 2 the respective equilibrium probabilities of acceptance of these proposals by the plaintiff. Each type of defendant is indifferent between these proposals. Hence,
Subtracting the first equation from the second one, we get
Hence, p 1 ¼ p 2 . 45 But in that case defendants of both types are strictly better off offering S 1 . Contradiction follows. Part 1.3: We show that under conditions (1)- (3), there are infinitely many partially separating equilibria (one of them is the one stated in Proposition 1) and infinitely many pooling equilibria. 46 44. No more than one equilibrium offer S 1 2 ½0, s 2 A þ K D implies that the grossly negligent defendant randomizes at most between two possible strategies, one of which is (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P .
45. The inequality s 1 þ s 2 < 1 holds by assumption (1). 46. Condition 0 < ½q(1 ÿ s 1 ) þ (1 ÿ q)s 2 fA ÿ K P < K F rules out the equilibrium where no lawsuit is filed and condition (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P > s 2 A þ K D rules out the pooling equilibrium, where the no-grossly-negligent defendant behaves as a grossly negligent defendant by making a positive settlement offer. A separating equilibrium is not possible in this game. Suppose that a separating equilibrium exists: no-grossly-negligent defendants offer S 1 s 2 A þ K D and grossly negligent defendants offer S 2 6 ¼ S 1 . Given that S 1 is always accepted by the plaintiff and S 2 is always rejected by the plaintiff, then the grossly negligent defendant has an incentive to deviate to S 1 because
Part 1.3.1: Existence of partially separating equilibria of the pretrial bargaining subgame.
The description of the partially separating equilibria is as follows. If conditions (1)- (3) hold (1) no-grossly-negligent defendants offer S 1 such that 0 S 1 s 2 A þ K D and grossly negligent defendants mix the two strategies, offer S 1 with probabilityb and offer S 2 ¼ (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P with probability ð1 ÿbÞ; (2) plaintiffs always file a lawsuit; plaintiffs always accept S 2 47 and mix between rejection (with probabilityã) and acceptance (with probability ð1 ÿãÞ when the offer is S 1 such that 0 < S 1 s 2 A þ K D ).
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Consider the expected payoffs for the plaintiff, no-grossly-negligent, and grossly negligent defendants, in terms ofã andb: The expected payoff for the plaintiff V P is
The expected payoff for the no-grossly-negligent defendant V D 1 is
And, the expected payoff for the grossly negligent defendant,
The values ofã andb are calculated from the condition that both parties (the plaintiff and the grossly negligent defendant) have to be indifferent between their strategies to mix them. So,
47. A defendant offering S 2 reveals his/her type, and hence, S 2 should be equal to (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P to be always accepted.
48. As the plaintiff accepts some of the offers of S 1 , a grossly negligent defendant has an incentive to mimic the behavior of the no-grossly-negligent defendant and offer S 1 as well. Equation (A4) says that a grossly negligent defendant is indifferent between admitting his/her negligence (i.e., offering S 2 ¼ (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P and stating that he/she is no-grossly-negligent (i.e., offering S 1 ) with the risk to lose (1 ÿ s 1 )A þ K D if the case goes to court. Equation (A5) says that a plaintiff is indifferent between dropping the case and getting a payoff of S 1 and going to court. Solving equation (A4) forã and equation (A5) Then, the expected payoffs for the plaintiff, grossly negligent, and no-grosslynegligent defendant are
The equilibrium beliefs are as follows. If an accident occurs, the plaintiff believes with probability (1 ÿ q) that he/she is confronting a no-grosslynegligent defendant and with probability q that he/she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant. When the plaintiff receives an offer, he/ she updates his/her beliefs using Bayes' rule: when he/she receives an offer S 1 , he/she believes with probability ð1ÿqÞ qbþð1ÿqÞ that he/she is confronting a nogrossly-negligent defendant and with probability qb qbþð1ÿqÞ that he/she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant; when the plaintiff receives an offer S 2 , he/she believes with certainty that he/she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant.
The off-equilibrium beliefs are as follows. When the plaintiff observes an offer S# < S 1 or an offer S 1 < S# < (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P , he/she believes that he/she faces a grossly negligent defendant. Then, the plaintiff rejects the offer with certainty because he/she will obtain a higher payoff ((1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P ) if he/she brings the grossly negligent defendant to trial. Given that S# is rejected with certainty, the no-grossly-negligent defendant will not make the offer S# because he/she will receive a higher payoff by offering S 1 , which is accepted with positive probability in the proposed equilibrium. Given that the plaintiff will reject the offer S# with certainty, the grossly negligent defendant will not make an offer S# because he/she will receive a higher payoff by offering S 2 ¼ (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P with probability ð1 ÿbÞ and S 1 with probabilityb (as stated in the proposed equilibrium). Part 1.3.2: Existence of pooling equilibria of the pretrial bargaining subgame.
The description of the pooling equilibria is as follows. If ½q(1 ÿ s 1 ) þ (1 ÿ q)s 2 fA ÿ K P > 0 and (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ K P > s 2 A þ K D : (1) grossly negligent and no-grossly-negligent defendants offer the same amount S, where 0 < S s 2 A þ K D , and S ! ½q(1 ÿ s 1 ) þ (1 ÿ q)s 2 fA ÿ K P ; (2) plaintiffs always file a lawsuit; (3) and plaintiffs always accept the offer S.
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The equilibrium beliefs are as follows. If an accident occurs, the plaintiff believes with probability (1 ÿ q) that he/she is confronting a no-grosslynegligent defendant and with probability q that he/she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant. Given that defendants pool, when the plaintiff receives an offer, he/she cannot update his/her beliefs. Then, the plaintiff accepts if the offer is greater than or equal to his/her ex ante expected return from trial (S ! ½q(1 ÿ s 1 ) þ (1 ÿ q)s 2 fA ÿ K P ). 51 The off-equilibrium beliefs compatible with this equilibrium are as follows. If the defendant offersS 6 ¼ S; then the plaintiff believes with certainty that he/she faces the grossly negligent defendant and rejects the offer.
Part 2: Uniqueness of the pretrial bargaining subgame equilibrium. We prove that the PBE stated in Proposition 1 is the only PBE that survives the universal divinity refinement and is the partially separating PBE, and therefore, this is the unique equilibrium of the litigation stage. We proceed first to apply the universal divinity refinement to the partially separating equilibria and second to the pooling equilibria. The implementation of the universal divinity refinement proceeds as follows. First, we find (for no-grossly-negligent and grossly negligent defendants) the minimum probability of acceptance (by the plaintiff) of an offer that differs from the equilibrium offers (deviation offer), such that the defendant is willing to deviate. Second, we compare these minimum probabilities. The defendant with the lower minimum probability will be the one the plaintiff should expect (with probability one) to deviate. Part 2.1: Elimination of the other partially separating equilibria. Consider the deviation S# from an equilibrium offer S 1 or S 2 . We will cover the analysis of three cases:
For mathematical convenience, define S# ¼ S 1 ÿ e. If e < 0, then the deviation offer S# > S 1 and if e > 0 then the deviation offer S# < S 1 .
Proceed first to analyze the case of the grossly negligent defendant. The grossly negligent defendant will be willing to deviate if 50. If S s 2 A þ K D fails to hold, the no-grossly-negligent defendant will find it optimal to deviate, to offer 0 and go to trial; if S ! ½q(1 ÿ s 1 ) þ (1 ÿ q)s 2 fA ÿ K P fails to hold, the plaintiff will find it profitable to deviate and reject the proposal S.
Note also that there is no possible pooling with S ¼ 0 and plaintiff accepting the offer with certainty: if every defendant offers S ¼ 0, then the plaintiff will be better off by rejecting the offer because ½q(1 ÿ s 1 ) þ (1 ÿ q)s 2 fA ÿ K P > 0, that is, his/her ex ante expected payoff from going to trial is greater than the offer. Then, it would be optimal for the grossly negligent defendant to deviate from offering
51. The plaintiff computes the ex ante return from trial by using his/her prior beliefs and the payoffs at trial from confronting grossly negligent and no-grossly-negligent defendants. So, the ex ante return from trial q½(1 ÿ s 1 )fA
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the grossly negligent defendant from deviating and the right-hand side represents his/her expected loss in equilibrium. 52 Solving for p N we get
Then, the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation offer made by the grossly negligent defendant is
Now find the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation by the plaintiff, such that the no-grossly-negligent defendant is still willing to propose it.
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the no-grossly-negligent defendant from deviating and the right-hand side represents his/her expected loss in equilibrium. 53 Solving for p C we get
Then, the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation offer made by the no-grossly-negligent defendant is 52. Note that in every partially separating PBE of the litigation game (under the conditions qfA ÿ K P > 0 and fA ÿ K P > K D ), the expected payoff for the grossly negligent defendant is fA ÿ K P .
53. Remember thatãðS 1 ¼ 0Þ ¼ a: Given that we need to apply the results of this proof to check all partially separating PBEs of the litigation game, we will useã in the computation of the expected payoff for the no-grossly-negligent defendant. Note that in every partially separating PBE of the litigation game (under the conditions qfA ÿ K P > 0 and fA ÿ K P > K D ) the expected payoff for the no-grossly-negligent defendant does depend on S 1 .
Compare the threshold probabilities for the grossly negligent and no-grosslynegligent defendant.
where the expressions in bracket and parentheses are positive. Then, if e < 0, p N < p C and, if e > 0, p N > p C . Following the universal divinity refinement, if 0 S# < s 2 A þ K D and e < 0 (S# > S 1 ), the plaintiff should believe that the deviation S# comes from a grossly negligent defendant with probability one. On the other hand, if e > 0 (S# < S 1 ), the plaintiff should believe with probability one that the deviation S# comes from a no-grossly-negligent defendant.
Apply the universal divinity refinement to the other partially separating equilibria (where 0 < S 1 K D ). The off-equilibrium beliefs imply that the plaintiff should infer that any deviation S# comes from a grossly negligent defendant. In case of e > 0 (S# < S 1 ), these off-equilibrium beliefs do not survive the refinement. The plaintiff should believe that the deviation comes from a nogrossly-negligent defendant and accept the offer. This response from the plaintiff will generate an incentive for the grossly negligent defendant to deviate and offer S 1 ÿ e. Hence, the other partially separating equilibria (where 0 < S 1 K D ) do not pass the test of universal divinity for 0 S# < s 2 A þ K D .
We will apply now the universal divinity refinement to the empirically relevant equilibrium (where S 1 ¼ 0). The off-equilibrium beliefs imply that the plaintiff should infer that any deviation comes from a grossly negligent defendant. Note also that given that S 1 ¼ 0 is the lowest possible offer, only deviations above S 1 (i.e., S# > S 1 ) are possible. Therefore, the off-equilibrium beliefs survive the universal divinity refinement. Hence, the empirically relevant equilibrium passes the test of universal divinity for 0
The minimum probability of acceptance of a deviation offer made by the grossly negligent defendant is still given by equation (A8).
For the case of the no-grossly-negligent defendant, note that his/her expected deviation loss is s 2 A þ K D and his/her expected equilibrium loss is in the interval
and is equal to
. Then, for any probability of acceptance, the no-grossly-negligent defendant will not be willing to deviate
By universal divinity, the plaintiff should expect that any deviation offer S# ¼ s 2 A þ K D comes from a grossly negligent defendant. Thus, all partially separating PBEs pass the test of universal divinity for
Given that the partially separating PBE stated in Proposition 1 is the only partially separating equilibrium that survives the universal divinity refinement in both cases, then the equilibrium proposed in Proposition 1 is the only universal divine partially separating PBE.
Part 2.2: Elimination of the pooling equilibria. Consider the deviation S# from an equilibrium offer S. We will cover the analysis of two cases:
For mathematical convenience, define S# ¼ S ÿ e. If e < 0, then the deviation offer S# > S, and if e > 0, then the deviation offer S# < S.
Proceed first to analyze the case of the grossly negligent defendant. The grossly negligent defendant will be willing to deviate if
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the grossly negligent defendant from deviating and the right-hand side represents his/her expected loss in equilibrium. 54 Solving for p N we get
54. Note that in every pooling PBE of the litigation game (under the conditions qfA ÿ K P > 0 and fA ÿ K P > K D ) the expected payoff for the grossly negligent defendant is S.
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the no-grossly-negligent defendant from deviating and the right-hand side represents his/her expected loss in equilibrium. Solving for p C we get
Then, the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation offer made by the no-grossly-negligent defendant is
Note that inspection of equations (A21) and (A18) show that if e < 0, the lefthand side of the inequalities will be greater than 1. Given that the right-hand side of the inequalities correspond to probabilities (which cannot be greater than 1), the inspection of these equations permits us to conclude that the universal divinity refinement is not applicable for cases where e < 0. Then, we will proceed to the application of the universal divinity refinement only in cases where e > 0.
Compare the threshold probabilities for the grossly negligent and nogrossly-negligent defendant.
where A and the expressions in parentheses are positive. Then, if e > 0, p N > p C . Following the universal divinity refinement, if 0 S# < s 2 A þ K D and e > 0 (S# < S), the plaintiff should believe with probability one that the deviation S# comes from a no-grossly-negligent defendant.
Apply the universal divinity refinement to the pooling equilibria (where 0 < S s 2 þ K D ). The off-equilibrium beliefs imply that the plaintiff should infer that any deviation S# comes from a grossly negligent defendant. These offequilibrium beliefs do not survive the refinement. The plaintiff should believe that the deviation comes from a no-grossly-negligent defendant and accept the offer. This response from the plaintiff will generate an incentive for the grossly negligent defendant to deviate and offer S ÿ e. Hence, the pooling equilibria (where 0 < S s 2 A þ K D ) do not pass the test of universal divinity for 0 S# <
The minimum probability of acceptance of a deviation offer made by the grossly negligent defendant is still given by equation (A11).
For the case of the no-grossly-negligent defendant, note that his/her expected deviation loss is K D and his/her expected equilibrium loss is in the interval
. Then, for any probability of acceptance, the no-grossly-negligent defendant will not be willing to deviate when S# ¼ K D . By universal divinity, the plaintiff should expect that any deviation offer S# ¼ K D comes from a grossly negligent defendant. Thus, all pooling PBEs pass the test of universal divinity for
Given that no pooling PBE survives the universal divinity refinement in both cases, there is no universal divine pooling PBE.
Hence, the partially separating PBE stated in Proposition 1 is the unique universally divine PBE of the litigation stage.
Q.E.D.
Part 3: Existence and uniqueness of the game equilibrium.
In the third part, we prove that some but not all potential plaintiffs file a lawsuit, that some but not all potential injurers are grossly negligent, and that the described mixed-strategy equilibrium is the only equilibrium of the game.
Part 3.1: Some but not all potential plaintiffs file a lawsuit. We prove that 0 < m < 1. The proof has two parts.
Part 3.1.2: m < 1. We will prove that m < 1 if and only if s 1 < s 1 ¼ 1 ÿ
; where
A : First, we show that m is increasing in s 1 and s 2 . Next, we compute s 1 and s 2 : Part 3.1.2.1: Differentiating m, the probability of filing, equation (14), with respect to s 1 , yields
Differentiating m, equation (12), with respect to s 2 yields
Hence, an increase in s 1 or s 2 raises filing.
Part 3.1.2.2:
Computation of s:
The maximum feasible range of s 1 consistent with m < 1 is attained if s 2 ¼ 0. Given that m is increasing in s 1 , m < 1 if and only if s 1 < s; where s 1 is defined implicitly by mðs 1 ¼ s 1 ; s 2 ¼ 0Þ ¼ 1:
The condition mðs 1 ¼ s 1 ; s 2 ¼ 0Þ ¼ 1 can be rewritten as:
After some straightforward algebraic manipulations, the last equation becomes: < 0: Hence, one root is negative, and the other one is positive. The negative value of 1 ÿ s 1 means that s 1 > 1, which is impossible. Hence, to calculate s 1 ; we need to calculate the positive (the larger) root of the equation (A26). Therefore,
Computation of s 2 :
Given that m is increasing in s 2 for any given s 1 , m < 1 if and only if s 2 < s 2 ðs 1 Þ; where s 2 ðs 1 Þ is defined implicitly by mðs 1 ; s 2 ¼ s 2 ðs 1 ÞÞ ¼ 1:
The last equation can be rewritten as:
Solving the last equation for s 2 yields
Part 3.2: Some but not all potential injurers are grossly negligent. We prove that 0 < q < 1. By condition (3), K P > s 2 fA. Then, 0 < q. In addition, condition (2) implies that q < 1.
Part 3.3: Uniqueness of the game equilibrium. We prove that the described mixed-strategy equilibrium is the only equilibrium of the game.
Suppose that the probability of being negligent is greater than the one set by equation (15) (it can be equal to one), that is,p > p: This will imply a lower conditional (on the occurrence of the accident) probability that the defendant is grossly negligent,q < q; determined by equation (14) . Given that the expected payoff of the plaintiff, ½q(1 ÿ s 1 ) þ (1 ÿ q)s 2 fA ÿ K P depends positively on q, it will be lower as well. Hence, the probability of filing m will be also lower. But in that case, the left-hand side of equation (10) will be greater than the right-hand side. Therefore, it will be optimal for all prospective defendants not to take care, which contradicts the initial assumption thatp > p: The impossibility of the opposite case,p < p can be shown similarly.
Proof of Proposition 2. Differentiating m, the probability of filing, equation (16), with respect to s 1 , yields
Hence, an increase in s 1 raises filing. 
In words, an increase in the level of court error s 1 reduces the probability that the potential defendant chooses to be no-grossly-negligent and, hence, reduces the general level of care and increases the unconditional probability of an accident,
. Given that @q @s 1 > 0; then, the effect of s 1 on the conditional probability of trial can be obtained as follows.
Differentiating the conditional probability of trial, equation (8), with respect to s 1 yields
Hence, an increase in s 1 reduces the conditional probability of trial. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Differentiating m, equation (16), with respect to s 2 yields
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof proceeds in two parts. First, we show the effects of the introduction of damage caps, and second, we prove the effects of the introduction of split awards.
Therefore, a reduction in A increases the probability of filing. Differentiating q, equation (18) 
The last inequality holds because @m @A < 0 and F ÿ1 (m) þ K P ÿ s 2 fA > 0. Given that @q @A < 0; then the effect of A on the conditional probability of trial and the probability that a defendant chooses to be no-grossly-negligent can be obtained as follows.
Differentiating the conditional probability of trial, equation (8), with respect to A yields
Hence, the introduction of damage caps, that is, the reduction in A, reduces the conditional probability of trial. Differentiating the probability that a defendant chooses to be no-grosslynegligent p, equation (20), with respect to A yields
In words, an increase in the expected level of court award reduces the probability that the potential defendant chooses to be no-grossly-negligent and, hence, reduces the general level of care and increases the unconditional probability of an accident,
Part 2: Differentiating the probability of filing, equation (16), with respect to f yields
Differentiating q, equation (18) 
The last inequality holds trivially because (F ÿ1 (m))# > 0 and @m @f < 0: Given that @q @f < 0; then, the effect of f on the conditional probability of trial and the probability that a defendant chooses to be no-grossly-negligent can be obtained as follows.
Differentiating the conditional probability of trial, equation (8), with respect to f yields
Differentiating the probability that a defendant chooses to be no-grosslynegligent p, equation (20), with respect to f yields
Solution of the Model of Liability and Litigation under the English Rule
Equilibrium Characterization. The structure of the equilibrium is similar to the one adopted for the benchmark model. This equilibrium constitutes the unique PBE of the game that survives the universal divinity refinement of Banks and Sobel (1987) under the following conditions:
0 s 2 < minŝ 2 ðs 1 Þ; Plaintiff's Beliefs. The equilibrium beliefs are as follows. If an accident occurs, the plaintiff believes with probability ð1 ÿqÞ that he/she is confronting a no-grossly-negligent defendant and with probabilityq that he/she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant. When the plaintiff receives an offer, he/she updates his/her beliefs using Bayes' rule: when he/she receives an offer S 1 ¼ 0; he/she believes with probability ð1ÿqÞ qbþð1ÿqÞ that he/she is confronting 55. Conditions (A44)-(A46) are equivalent to conditions (1)-(3) in the benchmark model. Under these conditions, there are other partially separating equilibria and pooling equilibria, which are ruled out by the divinity criterion. a no-grossly-negligent defendant and with probabilityˆqb qbþð1ÿqÞ that he/she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant; when the plaintiff receives an offer S 2 ¼ ð1 ÿ s 1 ÞfA ÿ s 1 ðK P þ K D Þ; he/she believes with certainty that he/she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant. The off-equilibrium beliefs are as follows. When the plaintiff receives an offer S# such that 0 < S# < (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ !s 1 (K P þ K D ) or when he/she receives an offer S# > (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ s 1 (K P þ K D ), he/she believes that this offer was made by a grossly negligent defendant.
Proof. Following the steps described in the proof of Proposition 1, it is easy to show that Proposition 5 holds.
Equilibrium Solution. The model is solved backward. We start by finding the solution of the pretrial bargaining subgame. Then, we evaluate the plaintiff's filing decision and assess the defendant's choice of care.
Note first that under the English rule, the expected payoff at trial for the nogrossly-negligent and grossly negligent defendants are ÿs 2 (A þ K P þ K D ) and ÿ(1 ÿ s 1 )(A þ K P þ K D ), respectively. The expected payoff at trial of the plaintiff is s 2 fA ÿ (1 ÿ s 2 )(K P þ K D ) if the defendant is no-grossly-negligent, and it is equal to (1 ÿ s 1 )fA ÿ s 1 (K P þ K D ) if the defendant is grossly negligent.
The values ofâ andb are calculated from the condition that both parties (the plaintiff and the grossly negligent defendant) have to be indifferent between their strategies to mix them. 56 Then,
and b ¼ ½ð1 ÿ s 2 ÞðK P þ K D Þ ÿ s 2 fAð1 ÿ qÞ q½ð1 ÿ s 1 ÞfA ÿ
The expected litigation payoffs for the plaintiff, no-grossly-negligent, and grossly negligent defendant are V P ¼qð1 ÿbÞ½ð1 ÿ s 1 ÞfA ÿ s 1 ðK P þ K D Þ 1 qfAð1ÿs 1 ÿs 2 Þþs 2 fAÿ½ð1ÿqÞð1ÿs 2 Þþqs 1 ðK P þK D Þ; V D 1 ¼ ÿqð1ÿs 1 Þþ ½ ð1ÿqÞs 2 ÞfAÿ½qs 1 þð1ÿqÞð1ÿs 2 ÞðK P þK D Þ; and V D 0 ¼ ÿ½ð1ÿs 1 ÞfAÿ s 1 ðK P þK D Þ; respectively.
The conditional probability of trial is given bŷ
56. These conditions are as follows: ð1 ÿ s 1 ÞfA ÿ s 1 ðK P þ K D Þ ¼â½ð1 ÿ s 1 ÞðA þ K P þ K D Þþ ð1 ÿâÞð0Þ and 0 ¼ˆqb qbþð1ÿqÞ ½ð1 ÿ s 1 ÞfA ÿ s 1 ðK P þ K D Þ þ 1ÿq qbþð1ÿqÞ ½s 2 fA ÿ ð1 ÿ s 2 ÞðK P þ K D Þ; for the grossly negligent defendant and plaintiff, respectively.
Using the previous results on plaintiff's expected payoff from litigation, we analyze now the plaintiff's decision about filing.
A plaintiff will file a lawsuit if his/her expected payoff from suing (i.e., expected litigation payoff net of filing costs) is positive, that is, if qfAð1 ÿ s 1 ÿ s 2 Þ þ s 2 fA ÿ ½ð1 ÿqÞð1 ÿ s 2 Þ þqs 1 ðK P þ K D Þ ÿ K F > 0: ðA50Þ Then, the probability of filing is Fð½qð1 ÿ s 1 Þ þ s 2 ð1 ÿqÞfA ÿ ½ð1 ÿqÞð1 ÿ s 2 Þ þqs
The defendant is indifferent between taking care and not taking care in equilibrium, and then he/she randomizes between both strategies. The indifference condition is c þmk 1 s 2 fA ÿ s 1 1 ÿ s 1
Solving the last equation form; we obtain the probability of filing that supports the randomization of the choice of care.
It is important to note that m > 0 because k 0 > k 1 (by assumption) and because condition (A44) ensures that s 2 1ÿs 1 < 1: In addition, conditions (A45) and (A46) guarantee that m < 1.
Then, using equation (A52), we obtainq; the probability that an accident is caused by a grossly negligent defendant.
The expression forq is always positive because (
by condition (A46). In addition, condition (A45) implies thatq < 1: Then,p; the probability that a defendant chooses to be no-grossly-negligent is given bŷ 
Using the previous results, we now derive the probability of accident l ¼ k 1p þ k 0 ð1 ÿpÞ and the unconditional probability of trial : Third, we conclude that under the American rule the probability of filing m is higher than under the English rule. 
Part 3: In parts 1 and 2, we show that both terms in the denominator of the expression for m under the American rule are smaller than corresponding terms under the English rule. Hence, m is lower under the English rule. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Define
The proof proceeds in three parts. First, we show that the second term of equation (A58), can be rewritten as
because AK P > fAK P and AK D > fAK D .
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Part 2:q < q if and only if
Given that fA þ K P þ K D > fA andm < m (filing is lower under the English rule), (K P þ K D )(1 ÿ s 2 ) < K P is a sufficient condition forq < q to hold. It is straightforward to show that (K P þ K D )(1 ÿ s 2 ) < K P is equivalent to
Part 3: Q.E.D.
